Twitter-squatters

In the early 90’s the term “cybersquatter” was coined for internet profiteers whose sole strategy was to register domains in the name of businesses and sell these domains to the associated businesses for big bucks. This has since become illegal following legislation passed in 1999, which granted trademark users the right to sue cybersquatters. Now in the late 2000’s, businesses are facing a similar hurdle and a new term is soon to be forged. Twittersquatters, perhaps?

The mystifying success of Twitter, a service that essentially sends text messages en masse that updates anyone on what you’re doing, has led to problems for businesses who didn’t register for free Twitter accounts and are now being represented by non-associated people with accounts in their names. Soon everything will be sorted out, new legislation will be passed, and that will be the end of the issue until the next networking site springs up that provides a similar opportunity for _______squatters.

But maybe instead of waiting for the next opportunity to arise, we could create a universal solution in the form of a tied-ownership clause for businesses.

Tied ownership is a property right used to distinguish ownership of fugitive property; property that is not stationary or intangible, i.e. wild animals, ideas, etc. Tied ownership is the granting of a right based on the associated entity. The other type of fugitive property right is the right of first possessor – what is currently being used in most cyber related areas. The right of first possessor is axiomatic; the right is defaulted to the first one to claim ownership. What would happen if property such as twitter, facebook, and myspace accounts were defaulted to the tied owner – the entity associated with that name.

Right now the rule of first possessor is used because transaction costs are low; it is easy to determine who is granted the right to the account (the first one to register that account). But we are seeing the same sort of deadweight loss that occurred with cybersquatters in the 90’s, in addition to negative externalities in the form of defamation.

The deadweight loss comes from zero-sum activities, essentially inefficiency caused by over-investment of time and energy by squatters to acquire first possession of the account for the purpose of transfer, rather than production and creation of surplus value.

Sarah Needleman, from the WSJ, reports that unauthorized Twitter-ers have been representing certain businesses and in some cases, advocating their competitors and/or making false claims about the company. Cases such as this cause inefficiency that could otherwise be avoided by implementing a rule to tied ownership.

Unfortunately, the rule of tied ownership is difficult to implement and would cause much confusion. For example, which company would get the Twitter account “Aldo”? Would it be Aldo Shoes? Or Aldo Software Systems? And who would be the governing body that would regulate such matters? Trademark registration could automatically register the associated Twitter account; with any other Twitter similar accounts having to be manually registered by the company. If the company chooses not to register Twitter accounts that represent their trademark (such as Aldo Shoes and AldoShoes) then they forfeit any right to sue the owners of those accounts. This would create large incentives for companies to take care of the registration to avoid any inefficiencies in the system.

An Energy Bill with a Catch

Yesterday, a monumental energy bill was passed in the House. While liberals and conservatives are shouting out praise or disapproval, respectively, few have looked past party lines to gauge the real effects of the bill.

The bill is attempting to achieve one main objective which is a 17% reduction in economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. The proposed strategy is a cap-and-trade system with large amounts of domestic and international carbon offsetting opportunities. There are provisions in the bill which will assist and mitigate the primary objective such as renewable energy requirements on utilities, energy efficiency incentives for consumers and businesses, grants for green jobs, and research and development on carbon sequestering technologies.

Though I support a bill to mitigate use of carbon-producing technologies, I cannot say with confidence that this bill will be able to achieve that. A system of cap-and-trade can be effective but is easily sabotaged with offset credits. The theory behind cap-and-trade (in this case) is that the government will set a limit on CO2 emissions that can be released into the air and then issue permits to businesses to pollute in the specified range. This provides economic incentives to businesses to reduce emissions for whom it is inexpensive to adopt cleaner air technologies. These businesses can then sell their permits to businesses that cannot easily adopt clean air technologies. So far so good. But then the offsets begin. This allows a business to pollute above their permit allowance so long as they invest in carbon offsetting activities. These carbon offsetting activities could be planting trees in Brazil to encouraging US farmers to adopt energy saving farming practices. Businesses will then invest in the offsets until the cost of offsetting reaches the cost of buying permits. The problem is that offsets reverse any intention and effect that capping has - i.e. it is the purpose of the cap to reduce emissions but offsets allow firms to pollute past the cap as long as they pay for it.


Economically, this makes sense. Those who pollute must pay. But the goal of the bill clearly specifies a 17% decrease in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. If the goal is a reduction, then offsets will not help. If the goal instead is to increase the cost of polluting to reduce consumption, then cap-and-trade with offsets is the right system. it might seem that in both cases the reduction in emissions is realized, but in the first system, without offsets, the amount of emissions is set and final, while the with the offsets, the amount of emissions will depend on a multitude of factors such as firm's cost structures, elasticity of demand for that firms products, elasticity of supply of that firm, etc. And this is where it becomes complicated.

Further, though I have not done the research, it seems a bit far fetched to me that planting forests in South America will offset emissions released in the US. On average, maybe this is true, but this isn't statistics where the average rules. This is our air and I want the air I breath in the US to be clean, not clean "on average."

The Issue of Property Rights

Development economics is a hot topic right now. It seems to baffle everyone, even economist, why some countries fail and some succeed, and why some countries can do either quicker than some. There are many theories out there, all credible in some respect, that try to ascertain one common solution to the problem. It's hard to believe that one solution could fix all developing countries but there is a theory of property rights which goes a long way to identify and solve the problem of development.

Hernando De Soto, a Peruvian economist, tries to explain why poor countries are poor and rich countries rich. His theory centers around the legal system employed in those countries and more specifically, property rights.

A major assumption of economics, which is never discussed in economics classes, is that proper legal institutions must exist. For instance, if I wanted an apple from the store I might just take it without paying for it. If there were no legal institutions that provide incentives against theft, what is stopping me from stealing? It is basically impossible to have a functioning market without the correct legal incentives. De Soto brings this to the forefront in The Mystery of Capital in which he discusses the abominable state of legal rights in developing countries versus those in countries that are considered developed.

In developing countries it is not unusual for people to have houses and land. They build houses and cultivate crops on this land, just like in developed countries. But when it comes time to use that land for collateral for a loan, no matter the size, it is nearly impossible. Though many people occupy land in developing countries, very few have the legal paperwork showing that they own the land. It has been passed down through family generation after generation before deeds were issued or it was given to them during a land-reallocation project but the government was too busy to issue deeds. De Soto calls this "dead capital."

Dead capital is "stuff" that can't be used to generate surplus value. This stuff is normally land, houses, tractors, anything of value that is not legally beholden to anybody; in the legal framework, it is essentially community property. One of the big failures of communism is that there are no property rights and therefore, every thing is community property. When things are not owned, you cannot use them for personal gain; in this case, you cannot put them up as collateral.

The solution to this dead capital is to create a system of property rights that allow people in developing countries to use their things for more than just production. But creating a legal framework is difficult and has taken thousands and thousands of years in developing countries. Europe tested legal and political systems for years before settling on one and then refining it. The US lucked out in the our legal system was implanted by European powers but during early American history, property rights were rare the further west one moved.

The moral is, there may not be one cure for developing countries but before any economic solution can be tried and implemented, these countries must first create the correct framework for a market to function on. Without the correct legal foundations no amount of money, aid, or miracle cures can work.

TGR: Efficient Allocation System?

What's a TGR? Read Martin Feldstein's article in the WSJ.

Tradable Gasoline Rights are a great idea because they essentially solve the Tragedy of the Commons that is our ozone layer. By assigning the right to pollute we can internalize the marginal cost of CO2 emissions. The government would effectively set a cap (just like cap and trade) so that our consumption would be limited. This would be the mechanism for setting a market price that internalizes the societal harm of excessive gas consumption. Instead, if we were to implement a gas tax, we could to get to the same consumption but calculating the correct tax would be difficult or near impossible. TGR offers a simple solution to this difficult calculation. Further, many say a gas tax would be easier but a tax doesn’t limit quantity which is the objective of TGR. A tax would be effective if the sole objective were collecting higher government revenues and inflating the price of gas as to justify research and development on alternative energy technologies.

The best part about TGR versus tax is that TGR would be a progressive policy, i.e. it would tax those that use higher quantities more whereas a gas tax is regressive (all sales taxes are) and would essentially tax the poor proportionally more than the rich.

With a system of TGR there is an externality that arises which could be detrimental to society; that is the urban migration externality. If people are given the choice to sell or use their TGR, many would chose to sell and use less gas which might mean moving to more urban residences. China and many upcoming third world nations have major problems due to urban overcrowding where the city grew faster than the planners could keep up with which leaves poor sewage, water, and electricity structures.

Another problem with this system would be the rationing. I feel that getting the rationing correct isn’t necessarily the problem because the market will naturally reallocate the TGR to the people who value them the most but rather the share that are for businesses versus individuals. I have heard the suggestion that TGR should only be given to individuals where businesses would have to buy TGR which would create high incentives for businesses to invest in energy efficient technologies. This would also eliminate any political lobbying for higher allocations of TGR to certain industries.

I am not sure if my assumption that the market will allocate responsibly is valid and therefore, I feel that either the market will prevail or rationing correctly will be an integral part of a TGR system working. And this all goes back to Hobbes who said that if transaction costs are high (i.e. calculating allocations to each individual or household) then you have to get it right the first time. This is the major hurdle with a system of TGR.

The good thing with a TGR system there is little opportunity for a black market to start simply because a TGR would not be a tangible asset and the ability to transfer a TGR between individuals would be only possible within the electronic system – although we must give credit to all those hackers that find a way around most cyber-barriers.

Then the next hurdle is: how do you deal with mass transit? Would a part of a TGR be taken for every bus ride you take? Would it matter on the length of the ride? Would the price of the TGR just be passed onto the consumer via a bus ticket and the transit authority would get rationed TGR? This might make for a very volatile bus fare.